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From the Western point of view, Japanese companies remain mired in traditionand are very inefficient. Given objective measures of efficiency and profitability, it is hard to argue against this characterization, particularly for domestically
focused Japanese companies. However, one important change that has been occurring is
the recent steep reduction in the number of cross-shareholdings in the Japanese equity
market. These new shareholders are anxious to have a say in the actions of management,
and they are becoming agents of change in stodgy companies that must evolve in order
to survive. Activist investors have proven a successful force for change for U.S. companies,
and they are finally making some inroads in Japan. There have been many stumbling
blocks, including negative public and government opinion, resistant management, and
legal and regulatory issues that previously made it hard for activists to purchase a block
of shares. That said, even despite some high-profile prosecutions over the last two years,
the tide has begun to change, and the Japanese vernacular media and public have
increasingly been backing activist investors in their quest for better management of firms. 
Mr. Fusa first explained that private equity firms take control of the company and
change the way things are run from the inside, while hedge funds take control over a
block of shares and try to shake things up from the outside. His view is that hedge fund
players can often earn more money due to the additional management fees charged to
clients, as well as the fact that private equity firms usually have to pay a higher entry 
premium to gain control of a company. Mr. Fusa compared the current Japanese market
to where the U.S. market was 20 years ago, which is around the time private equity firms
in the United States really shook up an inefficient marketplace and there was a boom 
for hostile takeovers and, therefore, for the economy. Regarding hedge fund activism, 
Mr. Fusa expressed the importance of making a large investment in a company if there
are prospective strategic buyers willing to purchase at a premium.
Professor Milhaupt remarked on the importance of the legal environment for takeovers.
He discussed Japan’s embrace of U.S.-style defensive mechanisms for hostile takeovers 
in the last couple of years and the advent of poison pills. He noted, however, that the
city code of London would have been a better style of defensive mechanism for Japan
because a board neutrality principle, coupled with a mandatory bid rule, would have
done much more to enhance shareholder value. According to Professor Milhaupt, there 
is reason to be optimistic about the court system’s dealing with hostile takeovers and,
specifically, its record on striking down poison pills that are harmful to shareholders. He
fears that the image that Japan’s financial regulators are engaging in selective prosecution
is dangerous for the Japanese capital markets. 
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whole, particularly in terms of
stability, it also protected corpo-
rate management from the
discipline of the market. Not only
were long-term shareholders
largely indifferent to whether or
not managers acted to maximize
the value of their companies, but
also managers themselves were
indifferent to their company’s
share price, since their compen-
sation was not tied to share price
performance. 
However, with the banking
crisis of the early 1990s and the
ensuing many years of deflation,
the ability of firms to finance this
system of cross-shareholding has
been severely weakened. Cross-
shareholding fell from a peak of
above 40 percent of all shares in
issue, to about 25 percent today.
In many cases, for the first time,
it is possible for truly independ-
ent shareholders to acquire
meaningful stakes in Japanese
companies. The need for
Japanese companies to adopt
aggressive and often painful
reforms in order to respond to
the emergence of powerful new
competitors is encouraging inde-
pendent investors to become
agents of change. The aging pop-
ulation in Japan is another force
pushing domestic companies 
to become more efficient. The
need for restructuring has there-
fore been gradually—perhaps
begrudgingly—acknowledged 
by the general public, where
opinion is no longer automati-
cally unfavorable to those activist
investors who attempt to forge
change. This transition from
friendly long-term holders to
value investors has not been
smooth, nor have all casualties
been avoided. One of the first
and most aggressive of the hos-
tile activists, Yoshiaki Murakami,
is now being investigated by the
public prosecutor. Nevertheless,
even the most mainstream of the
domestic financial press, the
Nikkei newspaper, had to admit
this about Mr. Murakami: “While
Mr. Murakami’s exit from the
market was an inevitable outcome,
his actions as an investor prodded
corporate leaders to improve
business efficiency and steered
industry towards management
policies that valued shareholders.” 
Tonight we are fortunate to
have two activists from the front
lines in Japan speak with us.
They have both come a very 
long way to be here, and I would
like to welcome and introduce
them now. Koji Fusa has been an
investment banker pretty much
since he could walk. Prior to
establishing his current company,
Sandringham Capital Partners
Limited, his most recent position
was as head of investment bank-
ing for Credit Suisse Tokyo. 
We first met when he was a 
senior banker for S. G. Warburg
Securities, which later merged
into Union Bank of Switzerland
(UBS). Tony Miller has had a 
similarly distinguished career, first
as head of corporate finance at
Bear Stearns Asia, then as head
of Carlyle’s Hong Kong office,
and now as president of Ramius
Capital Group, Japan [Mr. Miller’s
comments were off the record
and do not appear in this report].
We are also fortunate to have our
own Curtis Milhaupt, Fuyo
Professor of Law and director of
the Center for Japanese Legal
Studies at Columbia Law School,
here to act as a commentator. 
KOJI FUSA
Founder and CEO, Sandringham
Capital Partners Limited
Thank you very much for theintroduction, Alicia, and to
everyone for coming tonight.
When I was asked to make this
presentation in December, I had
just appeared at a hedge fund
conference where the panel dis-
cussed whether activist funds or
private equity funds were more
profitable. I think this is an inter-
esting topic for a business school
as well. Tonight, I will talk about
several factors that are influencing
Japanese hedge funds as well 
as private equity funds. Most of
these characteristics are similar to
those of the United States or the
United Kingdom 20 years ago. 
There are a lot of private
equity players who are moving
into hedge funds. The reason for
this is simply because in hedge
funds, if you are making 1 to 1.5
percent for management fees,
there is an additional manage-
ment fee of 20 percent that
comes in every year. Most busi-
ness school students now want to
go into private equity, but if your
return for the investor is exactly
the same, the management fee
for private equity is basically long
dated. You have to pay back the
investor after you have harvested
some successful investment,
which is usually between five to
seven years. Let us say you have
a compound return of two times
over your investment. In addition,
let us say you have 20 percent 
on your return. For hedge fund
players, not only can you make
ALICIA OGAWA 
Director, Program on Alternative
Investments, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business,
Columbia Business School
Thank you to all for comingtonight to the 2007 annual
Mitsui USA Symposium. This is
the eighth year that the Center on
Japanese Economy and Business
(CJEB) and the Mitsui USA
Foundation have cosponsored
this symposium at Columbia
Business School. This year, the
event is also cosponsored by 
the Program on Alternative
Investments of CJEB, the Center
for Japanese Legal Studies at 
Columbia Law School, and
Columbia Business School’s 
student-led Japan Business
Association. We are here tonight
to discuss one of the most far-
reaching trends to emerge in
Japanese capital markets since
the 1960s, and by that I mean 
the increasing power of value
investors to set prices for publicly
traded shares of Japanese compa-
nies and thereby to set the
agendas for managers of those
companies. Since the 1960s, an
overwhelming proportion of pub-
licly issued corporate shares in
Japan have been held by friendly
counterparties. These counterpar-
ties would typically be creditors,
debtors, suppliers, or customers
of the issuers of the shares, and
the long-term commitment to
hold these shares remained intact
regardless of whether the share
price went up or down. While
this might have conferred some
benefits to the economy as a
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this 20 percent return, but you
also are making a 1–1.5 percent
management fee. If you are pri-
vate equity player, you are going
to make only 20 percent. There
are other issues to consider in the
case of Japan, but even though
private equity deals are fascinating
and make headlines in the news,
a hedge fund is more advanta-
geous if your primary goal is to
earn money. 
Japan is a fantastic market in
the sense that the interest rates
are low and the market is also
inefficient, just like the United
States was 20 years ago. You can
find very interesting companies
in the public market, meaning
that you can buy shares directly
from the market. If you are a 
private equity player, that is not
the case because you need to
control the firm, and, unlike
hedge funds, you may not be
able to accumulate undervalued
shares through the public mar-
kets. Hedge funds should not go
for control. Hedge funds should
shake up the company to pay out
more dividends, say one times
the net asset value. Eventually,
hedge funds may want to sell
their interest at a higher price to
an investor seeking a controlling
position, and they can use the
existence of such an investor for
their own benefit. We saw an
example of this a year ago with
Mr. Murakami, who was holding
a substantial position in Nippon
Broadcasting Systems and who,
after lobbying for strategic change
in the company, decided to sell
his stake to Livedoor, which was
seeking corporate control. Such 
a partnership is an example of
the most successful way for an
activist to exit. Private equity
funds can also benefit from
shareholder activism, as the path
to control becomes apparent if
enough shares are accumulated
by activist funds. 
There are many famous
activists, but many activists also
fail. When you are initially
acquiring shares, you are gener-
ally fairly safe because you have
been disciplined in making
investments at very low multiples.
However, as you shake up the
company for higher dividends,
you end up with a substantial
interest in a very illiquid position,
at an increasing share price. This
creates a very expensive portfo-
lio. If you are not going to have
new money, then you are going
to be in a very difficult situation.
You could get stuck.
In terms of entry price, pri-
vate equity firms usually have to
pay more, since the investment
they are making includes a con-
trol premium, i.e., a premium
above the prevailing market
price, because the investor will
now have control of the com-
pany. In contrast, since hedge
funds do not need control of 
the company, they can ask for 
a price that is at a discount from
the market price, as long as 
the amount is substantial. Also,
hedge funds can borrow money
from their portfolios to leverage
against certain positions. In the
case of the activist manager,
however, their position is very
concentrated. The leverage they
can have is a little bit limited,
while in the case of private equity
funds, money can be borrowed
against the controlling cash flow
or the underlying assets of the
company. That is a big difference
between hedge funds and private
equity funds. 
Real estate prices in Japan
have been rising again after
being depressed since the 1990s.
The stock market has been per-
forming strongly, and interest
rates are still low. Even though
the Bank of Japan is aiming to
raise rates, they will still stay
around 1 percent and will not
reach the level of 4 or 5 percent
in the foreseeable future. Under
these circumstances, if you can
identify an opportunity to get
control of a company, then,
clearly, private equity deals are
going to be extremely profitable,
since the cost of debt to finance
the purchase of control is negligi-
ble. Currently, private equity
groups are raising a lot of money
globally and are dominating
more than half of the emerging
equity markets because interest
rates around the world are low.
The confidence of Japanese
CEOs was restored about two
years ago. The stock market
reflected this return of confidence,
and the Nikkei and other indices
have risen about 40 percent since
2005. Stocks lagged last year, 
particularly because foreign fund
managers slightly restricted their
investments in the wake of scan-
dals like the one involving Mr.
Murakami. There was a percep-
tion—in my view, a correct
perception—that Japanese regu-
lators did not like hedge funds
and that they wanted to penalize
those making “too much” money.
Mr. Murakami was one of them. 
I am not sure if the latter is 
actually true, but that was the
perception from the outside. The
market the previous year was too
strong, so last year money shifted
out of Japan to other countries
that were lagging. That said, the
Japanese market was the only
market that lagged behind the
United States and Europe last
year, and we expect this to be 
a very strong year.
We should be aware that 
different activist funds have very
different beliefs and theses. Our
belief is that we cannot compete
with the big investment banks.
We want to do small deals, and
we want to be good in an area
that the banks are not. The prob-
lem with large banks is that there
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company, and we cannot make
money unless we gain control. 
ALICIA OGAWA
I cannot resist telling you thisstory. About ten years ago, 
I had a conversation with a
Japanese bank CEO who said 
he had no idea what his com-
petitor’s market valuations were.
When I asked him about his
view on share prices, he said he
just wanted to make sure the
absolute share price was higher
than that of his competitors. So if
for bank A the share price was
1,000 yen, he wanted his share
price to be 1,010 yen, regardless
of what the market capitalization
was. Anyway, here to make
comments on what we have
heard so far is Professor Curtis
Milhaupt of Columbia Law
School.  
CURTIS MILHAUPT 
Fuyo Professor of Law; Director 
of the Center for Japanese Legal
Studies, Columbia Law School
Iam very honored to have achance to comment on the
presentations. As a legal academic,
I am not qualified at all to com-
ment on Mr. Fusa’s analysis of the
underlying economic fundamen-
tals driving the business, so my
remarks are going to be much
closer to Mr. Miller’s comments
and really touch off on his
remarks on the institutional set-
ting. I will retrace some of his
steps and push a little bit more
on tax securities, corporate law,
the courts, and the media.  
I will begin with a very brief
history of how we got to this
point. Alicia has mentioned
cross-shareholding as a very
important factor. Its rise and
decline are important elements 
of how we got to this point. 
As Alicia mentioned, during the
rapid economic growth in post-
war Japan, shareholders were
largely passive. There are many
reasons for this. Standing behind
stable cross-shareholding were
legal rules that made it very
costly to challenge management.
There was a relatively poor public
disclosure regime that made it
very difficult for minority share-
holders to have information
about what management was
doing and to assess the quality 
of their business model. Mr. Fusa
mentioned that the markets are
still inefficient, but they are 
probably more efficient than they
were 30 or 40 years ago. The
social norm was to downplay
shareholder wealth maximization
as a legitimate goal. The norm
was to stigmatize hostile take-
overs that really promoted a
much broader stakeholder view,
and the firm instead centered
itself on employee welfare. There
is nothing wrong with that per
se, but I think the cumulative
effect of these various rules, insti-
tutions, and norms was a strong
managerialist model—probably
the strongest managerialist model
in the world during the postwar
period. I think that is the obstacle
that people like Mr. Miller and
Mr. Fusa have to overcome. It is 
a very strong tradition that is
entrenched, and I think that is
why it is such a controversial
topic today. 
This model began to crack in
the 1990s because of a recession,
corporate scandals, legal changes
that brought a wave of share-
holder derivative litigation against
Japanese management, increased
foreign ownership of stock, and
the gradual modernization of
Japan’s corporate law to make it
more flexible and shareholder
friendly. By the early 2000s, there
were several hostile takeover
attempts, albeit ones that were
small and unsuccessful, and a
few proxy fights. Mavericks like
Mr. Murakami began to appear in
the market, and slowly this sys-
tem began to crack and change.
In addition, huge institutional
investors, such as the Pension
Fund Association in Japan, were
getting anxious after years of
negative returns. They started to
use the proxy process to try to
improve corporate governance
and enhance their own returns.
We have thus arrived at a very
interesting moment where the
stage has been set for activism,
and people can even be, at least
cautiously, optimistic about the
future of shareholder activism 
in Japan. The environment has
changed quite significantly from
where it was 10 or 15 years ago. 
Let me touch on a few issues
that I think are important going
forward. First, the takeover
regime in Japan is very important
as an exit mechanism, particu-
larly for private equity investors.
The environment for friendly
takeovers is probably more
important than the one for hostile
deals, but the hostile deal envi-
ronment is very important as
well. An analogy was drawn to
the United States in the 1970s.
What was it that shook up man-
agement in the 1970s and that
broke apart these bloated compa-
nies? It was largely the hostile
takeover market, so I think the
environment for hostile mergers
and acquisitions in Japan is very
important. Japan has, for better
or worse, largely embraced U.S.-
style defensive mechanisms for
hostile takeovers in the last couple
of years. The legal environment,
is too much conflict between
their research, trading, and sales
departments. What we can do is
set up either private equity or
hedge funds. We can make a lot
of money per employee because
we employ a small number of
smart people, but we also have
to borrow money to make high
returns. 
Japanese banks had a very
bad year in 1997. For those of
you who do not know, around
this time, Alicia was an expert
witness on the Japanese banking
system before the U.S. Senate.
This was when foreign banks
made huge inroads in Japan.
Currently, the people in Japan
have to live with the choice
between Japanese banks and 
foreign banks that have superior
lending capabilities. The trend
right now is that there is a lot of
money to borrow because the
banks think that it is less risky to
lend to private equity and hedge
funds than to companies, as the
former calculate risk proficiently
before adding investments to
their portfolios. Conversely,
Japanese banks may not have
this analysis ability. Also, our
business is buying cheap assets,
doing an analysis of underlying
cash flow, and turning the busi-
ness around. We buy blocks of
shares, shake up the company,
force it to restructure, and then
sell the shares to somebody at a
higher price. It would be a joke 
if we could not exit from our
expensive position. 
In the end, the private equity
players move more quickly than
Japanese senior management at
large companies. Although pri-
vate equity is not the answer for
every company, it is important
that the market flourish and be
successful. The private equity
market is a very small market in
Japan because it is still very hard
to gain control of a Japanese
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which is very involved, tracks the
developments in the United
States. I am not sure that is a
good thing, but that is what we
have. Thus, we now have the
emergence of poison pills in
Japan. About 150 public compa-
nies have adopted some version
of a poison pill since March 2005,
which was when Livedoor made
its hostile bid for Nippon
Broadcasting. That is about 5 per-
cent of the public companies,
and surely many more poison
pills are on the way. Is this a
good development for Japan or
not? I would like to hear the
comments of the panelists on this
development, since in the United
States it is largely thought that 
the poison pill can actually work
to the benefit of shareholders. 
It gives target management lever-
age versus a hostile bidder and
increases share prices or at least
buys them time to find a better
deal. Do you think that the poison
pill is going to work that way 
in Japan? 
My sense is that the courts
have done a relatively good job
of striking down poison pills that
are harmful to shareholders, so I
am very impressed and optimistic
about the role that the courts
have played so far, even though
there have only been a couple 
of cases. I actually think that the
city code of London would have
been a much better choice for
Japan. The code is a board neu-
trality principle coupled with 
a mandatory bid rule, which
would have done much more to
enhance shareholder value than
the U.S. style. In any case, it is
too late to adopt this now. There
is an interesting story behind
why Japan gravitated toward the
poison pill. It has to do with the
influence of American legal and
financial advisers for the Japanese
government when they were
deciding on the public policy
response. Just note in passing
that lawmakers in Japan now seem
to be considering a mandatory
bid rule, which I think would be
a disaster because you already
have the poison pill. If you intro-
duce a mandatory bid rule, you
have double protection for man-
agement, and I think that would
be a belt and suspenders approach
that would virtually kill or cripple
the hostile takeover market. 
Secondly, we have proxy 
voting. The Asian Corporate
Governance Association recently
released a report examining the
quality of proxy voting rules in
Asia, and Japan ranked dead last,
with an overall rating of “poor.”
The biggest problems that were
identified were the concentration
of shareholder meetings in June,
short notice of shareholder meet-
ings, little time to vote before
meetings, and having insufficient
information in the proxy materi-
als for shareholders to cast an
informed vote. I would also like
to hear more from the panelists
about the prospect for proxy
contests in Japan. Are the rules
workable, and what needs to
change to make proxy contests a
legitimate threat or opportunity
in Japan? There has been a back-
lash against hostile takeovers 
due to their awful public image,
which I think is very important.
Shareholder activism is contro-
versial; it is new to Japanese
managers, and people seem to
paint it as something that is
Western or foreign to Japan. It is
still something that is perceived
as negative. This is not just a
Japanese phenomenon; look at
Korea, or the United States; it
happens everywhere. However, 
I think it is more prevalent in
Japan than in some other places.
Paying some attention to public
image is extremely important if
shareholder activism is to flourish
in Japan. It is interesting to 
note that the early shareholder
activists in Japan, as in Korea,
were actually civil society groups
that promoted shareholder
activism as a part of good corpo-
rate governance transparency and
as a way of making Japan better
in general. I very much agree
with Tony when he mentioned
that this cannot only be about
money because then it is bound
to fail. It is more than about the
money; I think it is good for
Japan. Paying attention to media
portrayals and public relations is
very important, and I would like
to ask the panelists if they have 
a media strategy. Do you try to
use the media, and what sort 
of strategies might be used to
improve media coverage of
shareholder activism in Japan? 
My final point is on the regu-
latory stance of the financial
regulators, including the prosecu-
tors, the Tokyo Stock Exchange,
and so forth. Obviously, the
international competitiveness of
the financial market is a very big
issue today in the United States
and Japan, and the regulatory
style of a given country is
extremely important. The United
States is currently arguing about
whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
has gone too far and whether we
have too aggressive a prosecu-
tion environment for corporate
activities. It is obvious that these
issues are very relevant in Japan
as well, but I have a slightly 
different take on the Takafumi
Horie and Yoshiaki Murakami
prosecutions. I do not think they
were targeted because they made
too much money. Who knows if
they will be convicted or not, but
I think there are many other peo-
ple active in the Japanese market
who did the same thing or worse.
Everyone knows this, so the
question is, why were these two
targeted for prosecution? The
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you look for when evaluating
prospective investment opportu-
nities? Are there any themes to
these opportunities that you are
looking for when investing in
Japan? 
KOJI FUSA
When we take a position,we usually ask ourselves,
who will be the strategic buyer
that will purchase at a premium?
In the case of Myojo Foods,
before we started, we sourced 
it to Steel Partners Inc. Besides
Nissin Foods, we also thought
that Sanyo Foods might provide
our exit for the company. In fact,
not only Steel Partners Inc. but
also Murakami and Symphony
Partners were in the beauty con-
test. The way Steel Partners got
it was that they presented them-
selves as a friendly activist. They
were represented by Mr. Kuroda,
who has since left Steel Partners.
When sourcing these deals, if
you are seen as friendly, you 
can get a block of shares. In this
case, the Okui family, which had
a 24 percent interest in Myojo
Foods, was happy to sell 12 per-
cent of its interest at the market
price, which is a substantial dis-
count compared to the net asset
value. And Steel Partners,
Murakami, and everyone else
were looking to Sanyo Foods 
as the potential buyer of their
strategic stake. And we did 
the same. In fact, one of our
positions in which we made 
an investment was sold in
December to a strategic buyer,
and the share price went up
three times above the price 
at which we purchased it.
Nonetheless, we make sure that
we take a large position if we
believe there is a buyer for the
business. It does not mean we
confirm a buyer before the deal;
that would be insider trading.
However, if you bet big and 
are successful, then you can
make a lot of money. 
QUESTION
Mr. Milhaupt, you mentionedthat you think the court
system is free from corruption. 
I am wondering if the court sys-
tem is the big problem, because
even if the courts are free from
corruption, how can we expect 
a judge to really understand
what is at stake when activism is
still new in Japan? 
CURTIS MILHAUPT
TThat is a good question.Traditionally, the courts
were not very involved in these
types of disputes, but only
because there were not very
many of them. Some of the rules
that they developed were quite
lax. For example, let us look at
the rule on issuing a block of
stock to a white knight. The
courts were quite permissive of
that, albeit not completely, as
they did strike down one or two
cases. We have to be careful
when we talk about the courts,
because it has really been one
court, or one judge, in the Tokyo
district court who has handled a
lot of these cases. The court has
done a very good job so far in
hostile takeover cases, of distin-
guishing between a defense that
is legitimate, or designed to
enhance the protection of share-
holders, and a defense that is
designed to entrench manage-
ment. We are talking about a
very short track record thus far,
but I think the courts have actu-
ally done a remarkably good job.
I think there is real reason for
optimism. I would say there has
not been any corruption. I think
they have handled these cases in
a very sophisticated manner to
this point.
In the United States, there is
something called the “Revlon
rule,” which says that if there are
competing bids for a company,
target management has an obliga-
tion to auction the company 
off to the highest bidder. When
the takeover guidelines were
adopted in Japan, lawmakers
shied away from incorporating
this into the Japanese framework.
I think that would have actually
been applicable in the cases that
you raised, so maybe we will see
some pressure develop for the
adoption of the Revlon rule.
selective prosecution is extraordi-
narily dangerous for the Japanese
capital markets. Of course, it is
possible that this is part of a 
legitimate effort to improve 
transparency and regulatory
enforcement in the market. That
is entirely plausible, but I think
there is an element of suspicion
that hangs over these prosecu-
tions because of who these
people are. I am going to end
with that thought and ask a
broad question of the panelists.
What needs to change in Japan 




I believe that selective prosecu-tion does not just happen in
Japan, but it happens here in the
United States and in other devel-
oped countries as well. I also
think the mentality of the
Japanese financial community
and authorities needs to change.
Everyone says Japan has a capi-
talist market, but it is not always
the case. People still want equal
results, not equal opportunity.
This mentality exists with most 
of the regulators as well. In order
for Japan to have a U.S.-style
capitalist market, first the com-
mercial law must be changed to
give more adequate protection to
shareholders. Second, the tax law
in Japan is so antiquated that if
you want to do efficient restruc-
turing of a company you have
bought, you have to pay nearly
40 percent of the profit to the tax
authority. Changes in both these
areas must be made to foster 
a more shareholder/capitalist-
friendly environment.  
QUESTION
Other than looking for cash dividends, what are
some of the other opportunities
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